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IN THE s{/:PREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WALTER F. MORGAN, HAROLD·· T.
MORGAN, GEORGE C·ROMAR, LESLIE
CROMAR, WILLIAM CRO·MAR,
EUGENE· CROMAR, :and ARLENE
CROMAR GEAR,
Plaintiffs and Re:spoments,

-vs.BERT SORENSON, DIC·K WIND, MRS..
BERT SORENS·ON, and MRS·. DICK
WIND,
Defenaa;n;ts amJ ,.A_ p:pell,mnts,
-ANDVERRUE THEOBALD, Administrator of
the Estate of James T·. Morgan, Dece!ased;
VERRUE THEOBALD, Administrator of
the estate of F'rank A. Cromar, Deceased;
Mrs. Frank Crom-ar, whose true and co~rect
name is otherwise unknown; JOHN BARNARD, and HAROLD EVAN,S,
Oross-Defen.d0/l'l4ts and Respomoot..s.

Case No.
8153

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF·
Appealed from the Fifth Judicial Cour't in 'and for
Juab County, Utah, Hon. Will L. Hoyt, Judge
A. ELIASON'
Delta, Ut'ah
Attorney for .A.pp.ellants.
ELDON
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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WALTER F. MORGAN, HAROLD T.
MOR·GAN, GEORGE CROMAR, LESLIE
CRO~!AR,
WILLIAM CRO·MAR,
EUGENE CROMAR, and ARLENE
CROMAR GEAR,
Plaintiffs and Respondent-s,

-vs.BERT SORENSON, DICK WIND, MRS.
BERT SORENS·ON, and MRS. DICK
WIND,
Defendamt.s and App·ellarnts,

Case No.
8153

-ANDVERRUE THEOBALD, Administrator of
the Estate of James T. Morgan, Deceased;
VERRUE THEOBALD, Administrator of
the estate of Frank A. Cromar, Dece,ased;
Mrs. Fr.ank Cromar, whose true and correct
name is otherwise unknown; JOHN BARNARD, and I-IAROLD EVANS,
(}ross-.Defend(Jfnts and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF· FACTS
It is felt that after reading the brief of respondents
that it is necessary to reply to the statement of the case
and the statement ·of facts as ·set out in respondents' brief
not only for the reason of correcting some of the stateInents therein, but the respondents in their brief have
1
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attempted for the first time in the entire proceedings
through their brief to completely reverse the posi~ion
of their case, and are attempting through their brief to
claim the prop·erty as heirs of J ame·s T. Morgan and
not :as grantees and vigilant op·erators a:s they pre'tended
to claim through their testimony at the trial hearing.

POINT I.
NO CONTINUING INTERES'T IN GRANTOR OF CLAIMS.

For the first time in the case the res.pondents on page
3 of their brief refer to a continuing right or interest of
the grantor James Morgan and again on page'S 5 :and 17
of said hrief tthe resplOndents over ·exerted in alleging and
referring to a co--ownership ·and co-tenant in the s-aid mining prop.erty, which re·lationsnip· they now seek to establish between the grantor and the grantees. It proiVides
a good arrangem·ent for the respondents if they "Can
have their cake and eat it too", or better ·still if they "Can
ride two horses ea.ch a different direction."
Referring again to the findings o.f the Court it should
be emphasized that the court found that between July 1,
1948 and July 1, 1949, more th·an $500 worth of labor
was p·erformed upon. the mining cl~aims in question. The
Court was. careful after hearing the testimony ·and seeing
the deme anor of the witnesses to refrain fron1 making
any finding of any work done from July 1, 1949 to July
1, 1950, which is the period in question and for which
period the ap·pell.ants contend a forefiture was committed.
1

The Court further found that James Morgan was
2
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the owner of three-fourths interest in the Black Jack
claims on April 10, 1949, and that the remaining interest
was held by the heirs and/or legal representatives of
Frank Cromar, who died prior to ApTil 10, 1949. The
Court further fround that on April 10, 1949, James Morgan executed a Quit Claim Deed to his sons, Walter F.
Morgan 'and Harold T. Morgan and then the: trial Court
added, "And it appears probable that said deed was intended as a deed of gift to take effect upon death of the
said grantnr." It is to the last inference or appearance
of the Court that the appellants object most strenuously
and contend that there is neither evidence· nor legal authority to justify any such appearance.
In order for the respondents to have any claim
in the mining property it must be acquired by reason of
the provision of House Resolution No.1764 of Public Law
107 of the 81st Congress "\Vherein assessment work for
the year ending July 1, 1951 was waived under the provisions of a moratorium of public Law 107, condition one
of which required the Claimants to file notice -of intention to hold. vVhether a notice satisfying the requirements of the statute was filed ·appe:ars to he the crux of
this ease.
Obviously the owneTs and claimants in this case did
not file any such no't'ice nor did they in tend or calculate
that any notice had been filed for or on behalf of them a:s
required under the provisions of Public L~aw 107. Referring to the· testimony of Walter Morgan at the hearing, (Tr. 15, 16) Mr. Morgan wa;s asked referring to the
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Quit Claitn Deed from his father to himself and brother
I-1arold.

Q.

Mr. Morgan you stJated tha:t you recorded the
conveyance you received from your father in
1951, is that right?
MR. ANDERSON: Objection on the grounds of
repetition.
COURT: Overruled.
Q. Did you file any instrument prior to that
time showing a record of any interest or claim
you had in the property, did you file ·any instrument he-fore you recorded that, showing
any interest or claim that you had in the
property?
A. No.
Again on cross examination of Walte-r Morgan (Tr.
301) he was asked :

Q. Mr. Morgan, what if anything, have you filed
of record or done about connecting any work
done in 1948 with the 1949 and 19·50 assessment work?
MR. ANDE·RSON: Just a moment, we obje-ct to
that as irrelevant and immaterial.
MR.

ELIAS~ON:

You asked the question on direct.

THE· COURT: He may answer.
A.

Q.

I believe I filed proof of labor.
What year did you file proof of labor? In
what year did you do that? What have you
filed of record or what have you done to connect any work done in 1948 and 1949 to the
assessment work required for 1949, ending
July 1, 1950?
4
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A.

None.

Q.

You haven't filed anything-done

A.

Not for 1949.

anything~

It is difficult to see how the respondent himself
could have been more definite and more thorough in testifying that he did not do anything to obtain the benefits
of the provi·sions of a moratorium under Public Law 107
than is expressed in the testimony herein quoted.
If the respondents, the witness being the principle
one of them, claim any interest or right by reason of a
notice of an intention to hold filed by ~ames Morgan on
this and other pr-operty more than three months -after he
had divested himself of any interest in the· property by
quit claim deed, then it would appear that the: witness was
obligated to so testify and advise the Court of any claim
which he made to the benefits accruing from the action~s
of this stranger, James Morgan.
The complete about face of the respondents as to the
effect of the Qurt Claim Deed from James Morgan to the
claimants, Walter Morgan and Harold ·T. Morgan is most
pronounced. No inference or reference whatsoever to co-ownership or a co-tenancy between the grantor, James
Morgan, and the grantees, Walter Morgan and Harold
Morgan is shown in the testimony, but the exact reverse
is strongly testified to ('Tr. 8) as shown by the following
testimony:
Q.

Well, what comment was made by your father
at the time he gave this (deed) to you~

5
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A.

His exact words I don't remember, but he just
wanted us to have all of his personal hold'ings
because he was ge·tting old.

Q. Where were you at the time he handed you
this instrument~
A.

In my shop in Santaquin.

Q. In your shop· at Santaquin. Who else was
p~resent, if anyone~
A.

My son.

Q. Your son. Anyone
A.

els.e~

No.

Q. What did you give your £·ather, if anything,
in return for this instrument~
A.

One

doll~ar.

Q. Did you give him a dollar there at the time
in the shop· at Santaquin~
A.

That is right.

Q. Did you ever give him anything else at the
time for thrs instrument~
A.

No.

Q. At the time that this purported deed w~s
given to you by your father, made out in the
name of Harold T. Morgan and/or Walter F.
Morgan, did he mention or make any statement as to why it was made in these two
names with the conjunetion and or between
them?
A.

No.

Q. Never made any statement about it~
6
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A.

No.

Q.

Did he st'ate what interest was Harold's and
what interest would be yours~

A.

It was mutually understood, all of our rights,
what our interests would he.

The answer to the princpial question involved in this
law suit was answered by the respondent W·alter Morgan
in the following direct and unequivocal testilnony relating to the interest of the respective parties in and to the
property after the Quit Claim D·eed was executed (Tr.
12, 13).

Q.

After you received that coveyance from your
father shown as Exhibit 7, did you enter into
possession of the claims referred to as Black
Jack 1 to 5 here-

A.

What~

Q.

Did you take possession of those claims, enter
upon the property~

A.

That was my father's itntention. (emphasis
ours.)

Q. Did you actually go upon the propery
A.

after~

I have been on the property several times
after, and before.

Any 'attempt on the part of the respondents herein
now to show or establish a continuing claim of co-owner
or co-tenant after the deed was executed in order to try
to take advantage of the benefits of Public Law 107 is
a dei~berate attempt to reverse the position taken by the
claimants themselves on the witness stand and supported
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throughout their entire- case 'by their continuing testi
mony. The respondents Walter Morgan and H.arold
Morgan make proof to their cl'aim of ownership in the
mining property by forcefully testifying of the definiteness with which the conveyance of the prop·erty was made
from James Morgan to Walter F·. Morgan and Harold
T. Morgan, describing the time of delivery ('l1 r. 8), consideration (Tr. 8), immediate c~aiming of possession and
fathers intention that the grantees take possession (Tr.
13). A rank injustice upon litigant's herein and an abuse
of all the laws relating to the subject would be affected
if the respondents were now permitted, as they attempted
to do 'in their brief, to say "We did not mean what we said
under oath on the witness stand." "We were not aware
how seriously our claim to the p·roperty would affe:et our
rights under the moratorium of Public Law 107. We now
mean to say our father, James Morgan, remained the
owner of the property, or a co-owner, or a co-tenant or an
agent or something th'at would enable us to get the benefits of him who was in fact a total stranger to the property after April 10, 1949." The numerous cases referred
to in the principal brief of the appellants will suffice to
establish the necessary legal ·authority for the proposition that the deed was complete in every phase transferring all interest to the grantees and divesting all rights
and interest in the grantor.
POINT II.
EVIDENCE SHOWS NO ASSESSMENT WORK FOR
YEAR ENDING JULY, 1950.

The respondents in their brief again depart from the
8
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findings of the Court in attempting to show some assessment work performed upon this. property 'by the claimants for the year ending July 1, 1950. It is obvious that
the trial Court found no evidence of assessment work
from July 1, 1949 to July 1, 1950. The finding of the
Court that ass.essment work performed from 1948 to 1949,
could be claimed to benefit the respondents and apply
under the moratorium for the assessment work required
for the years 1949 to July 1, 1950 was equivalent to stating that the Court found no evidence of assessment work
for the year ending July 1950, otherwise the legal p·roblems relating to the moratorium and the benefits therefrom and the effect of the Quit Claim Deed from James
Morgan to Walter F. Morgan and Har·old T. Morgan
would not have needed to have been discussed.
It is felt that some reference should be made here,
however, to some claims of the respondents in their brief
to assessment work allegedly done for the year ending
July 1, 1950. First of all the defendants (appellants)
testified that the following named persons were upon the
claims and that they did examine them and each of them
for the purpose of determining whether any assessment
\Vork was being done, with the time and circumstances
as follows: On July 3, 1949, Bert Sorenson and Ray Spor
were upon the property (Tr. 18, 20, 116, 317). Again on
July 20, 1949, Ray S·por and Bert Sorenson were upon
each of the cl'aims of the said mining property to inspect
them, (Tr. 28). The third trip to the p~roperty testified
to by the appellants was about the 18th of October, 1949,
9
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when Bert Sorenson, Wesley Sampson and John Sorenson testified to having gone to the property and inspected each of the claims (Tr. 34). The fourth visit to
the p-rop~erty by appellants after Jhly 1, 1949, was April
1, 1950 ( Tr. 39) when Wesley Sampson and Bert Sorenson visited and insp,ected the p~roperty. The fifth trip
to the property testified to by the appellants was June
25, 1950, when Ray Spor and Bert Sorenson visited
and inspected the prop~erty, (Tr. 46). The sixth trip to
the property was September or October 1950, when Bert
Sorenson and Wesley S'amp·son again visited and insp~ecte~d the property, (Tr. 50).
The seventh trip, to the property was l.n April 19·51,
when Bert Soresnon, Wesley Sampson and John Sorenson visited the prop·erty. The eighth trip to the property by appellants and the one just prior to the locating
by the appellants was June 1, 1951, when Ray Spor,
Bert Sorenson and John Sorenson again visited the
prop·erty ('Tr. 61). The final date of staking and locating
the property by the appellants 'vas June 15, 1951, at
which time Dick Wind, Bert Sorenson and John Sorenson located the claims Bl'ack Queen Nos. 1 to 5 o,·er the
abandoned forfeited Black Jack claims. Without going
into the details of each visit to the property on the dates
herein set out, it is sufficient to state that the transcript
as referred to reve'als a detailed examination of every
part or parcel of the claims on each of the visits of inspection to the p·rop,erty. Witnesses were asked if they
saw all of the prop·erty; if they went into the tunnul; if
10
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they used a light; what type of light was used; if the~
examined the end of the tunnel ; if they examined the
\V~alls of the tunnel;· if they went to each and every part
of the respective claims; if they covered areas sufficient
to see all of the property within the claims; if they s.aw
evidence of persons having been there; car or truck
tracks, equipment having been moved, water having heen
pumped, monuments or boundaries having been set up.

In each specific instance all four of the appellants'
witnesses testified that there had at no time been any
evidence of any activity whatsoever. Th·at the prope1 ty
remained throughout the entire p·eriod abandoned without any showing in the slightest degree of any minii.1.g
activity or work. This testimony remained entirely uncontradicted and undenied.

11he only slight bit of evidence referring to ·any 'vor1r
by the respondents from J'uly 1, 1949 to June 15, 1951}
\-vas the claim that one, Harold Evans had pumped out
a wintz at the end of a tunnel S'Orne time between July
7th and 16th. The statement made by s~aid Harold Evans
quoted on page 6 of the respondents' brief that three men
helped pump out the wintz and install stalls and stills was·
so contradicted by himself 'and others that it could not
be believed. In direct testimony as to who helped pmnp
the wintz he stated Hal Crumbal, Ernest Lancaster, Jack
Swift, Richard Stevens and Louis Stevens, who is now
deceased, (Tr. 225). On cross examination it became apparent to the witness that the appellant·s had testimony
that the men so named did not help in the purported op11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

eration and on cross examination, (Tr. 238-h) when asked
who went with him to pump the wintz he stated his sonin-law, Hal Crumho, was the only p~erson accompanying
him. The app·ellants' witnesses, Ray Spor and Bert Sorenson, 'Saw no evidence whatsoever of any pumping operations having been performed or any water having been
run from the mine, or any evidence of equipment having
be.en used there and they testified having sp·ent several
hours in investigating the p~roperty on July 20, 1949.
Further Victor Bray, an elderly man, testified for
respondents to having been upon the mining property
with J ame.s Morgan for three days, from July 19th to
2·2nd (Tr. 258). He state:d that they cleared out around
the tracks and stuff and was back and forth out of the
tunnel but he didn't see any evidence of any pumping
operations or any water th'at had been pumped out of
the wintz. It is extremely unusual that he would have
known nothing of the alleged pumping operations or
have seen no evidence of any water having been pumped
only three or four days after the p·umping had been completed on July 16th, two days before witnes'S Bray arrived.
It is interesting to note that the res;pondents in their
brief on page 13 report that Ray Spor te'Stified that when
he was upon the p~roperty on July 3, 1949, there was
evidence that water had he·en previously pump·ed out because he could see where wa:ter had been running down
liill on the outs~de of the tunnel, which indicated some
activity 'in· the way of pumping. The respondents even
12
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quo1ted with favor the testimony of Spor "that it had
probably been pumped within a month previous to July
1, 1949·."
Yet when Ray Spor was on the same property on the
20th day of July, 1949, he observed nothing that was different than when he visited the property on July 3rd.
Especially was he questioned relative to the matter of
any water having been pumped from the shaft. The
following questions and answers on this subject appear
on page 317-318 of the transcript.

Q. Did you hear the testimony of Mr. Evans
relative to the pumping of water from the
winze in the tunnel on the Black J aek Claim
No.1~

A.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

When you were there in July, the 20th, 1949,
was the water in the winze· any different than
it was when you were there in July first~

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Was there any dampness or mud anywhere
in the area of the tunnel different than it was
when you were there in July first~

A.

No, sir.

~~1R.

ANDERSON: We object to this as irrelevant and incompetent, ha:s no hearing upon the
issues, and not proper rebuttal, surrebuttal.

THE C·OURT: l-Ie may answer.
A.

No sir.

Q.

Did you hear Mr. Evans state that in pump-

13
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ing the water, a three inch pipe 'vas used for
five days for twenty-four hours a day~
A.

That is correct.

Q. Did you further hear him make the statement
that the water in the winze raised ap·proximately a foot every two-or about two feet
a minute~

A. Yes, sir.
Q. At that rate, h·ave you made any mathematical
computation as to the amount of water that
would be pump·ed fror.a that wintze at the time
Mr. Evans said it was pump:ed ~
MR. ANDERSON: I obje-ct to that as irrelevant
and immaterial, and not proper rebuttal.
THE COURT: fie may answer yes

Q.

o~.r

no.

Have you made any mathematical computation~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Would you tell me what you have comp·uted
as to the amount of water that would be
pump,ed from that winze if it was p·ump~ed
dry, or ap·prorimately dry, with the amount
of water raising as Mr. Evans stated it did
and the size of the winze being a six by six
shaft at a depth of approximately seventy
feet~

MR. ANDERSON: May our objection go to
this as not p-roper rebuttal or surrebuttal,
immaterial and irrelevant~
THE COUR:T: He may answer.
A.

Well, at the rate of flow of p·er minute, as

14
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raising two feet, six by six by two, times 7.48
gallons per cubic foot, the water raised according to that at the rate of 538.632 gallons
per minute, and that theTe, in a period of five
days would be 3,878,150.4 gallons in a period
of five days, the shaft was supposed to he
filled at the time they commenced pumping
which was 18,852.12 gallons of water in the
shaft.
MR. ANDERSON: I move to strike· as irrelevant
and immaterial, not proper surrebuttal.

T'HE COURT: It may stand.

Q. Did you hear the pump described by-

A. Yes.
Q. Mr.
A.

Evans~

Yes, sir.

Q. As to its make and size~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can a pump of that size and make pump that
much water in that period of time~
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Did you observe if water had been pumped
there, and that quantity of water or if any
appreciable quantity of water had been pumped, where it would have run from the mouth
of the tunnel~
MR. AND·ERSON: Just a moment, we object to
that as not proper surrebuttal. He went
into that on their case in chief. It is repetitious went into it and spent a half an hour
inter~ogat'ing about the quantity of water,
how far down it ran, and where it ran to.

15
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THE COURT: He may answer.
A.

Showed no evidence of-

Q. Now, wait a minute, did you see where the
water would have run from the tunnel had it
been pump·ed out~
A.

Yes, it would have run right down the ravine,
run p~ast the lower shaft in the Black J'ack No.
4 .and went right on down the ravine, if it had
been pumped out.

Q. Did you see any evidence on July 20th, when
you were there of any water having run down
the area you have just described~
A.

No, sir.

Q. Did you see any tracks up around the tunnel
where any person had been or equipment located~

A. No, sir.
Q. Would the water have run acros·s the road had
that amount been p·umped out~

A. Yes.
MR. ANDERSON: Just a moment, we object to
that a.s calling for a conclusion, it doesn't say
where the road is from the mouth of the
tunnel, it is immaterial, repetition, and not
prop·er surrebuttal.
A.

Yes sir,-

THE· COURT: He may answer.
A.

I would noticed it.

Q. Beg your
A.

pardon~

I say I would noticed it.

16
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Q.

Would it had to have run across the

A.

Yes, sir.

road~

Q. Was there· any evidence of dampness or mud
on the road~
A.

No, sir.

Q. Mr. Bray has described having dug a tunnel
in the mouth, or trench at the mouth of this
tunnel, approximately 360 feet and eight inches deep and about eight inches wide. Did you
observe that on or about the 20th of July~
A. No, sir.

Q. You were there right at the tunnel, weren't
you~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see any evidence of anyone having
camped there th·e previous day or so~
A.

No, sir.

Q. Any car or
A.

tracks~

Never seen any.

The respondents in their brief attempt to claim 36
shifts which is denied by their own witness Evans, who
finally stated that he and Crumbo were the only persons
that could have been there.
Some reference is made to timbers which were
used when the winze was pumped, which the appellants
contend was in April of 1949 and which fact was stated
to Bert Sorenson and others by Lancaster, respondents'
witnesses, (Tr. 286) but in referring to the stulls or sills
respondents' witness, Lancaster, testified as follows (Tr.
287):

17
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Q. How many timbers did you saw in 1949, for
Mr. Evans to take over to the Black Jack?
A.

It was either four or five stulls.

Q. Describe those stulls, will you'
A.

They are approximately around five foot to
five foot eight.

Q. vVhen you sawed them, you just sawed the
timber in two, is that right?
A.

Sawed the tim·ber in two, we measured them
and sawed them according to the length they
wanted.

Q. About four or five foot'
A.

Yes.

Q. What kind of ti1nber, p·urchased in the lumber
yard, or native timber'
A. No, regular ties, all railroad ties.
Q. Old
A.

rai~road ties~

Yes.

Q. Had been used before'
A.

Yes.

Q.

That was the only timber that was sent over
to the Black Jack at that time'

A.

Except a few pieces of lagging.

When questioned further about the lagging the witness testified they were four or five p~ieces of used board
that could have been picked up, might have come from
Kearn·s or any where. Those four or five pieces were
according to the witness four or five feet long (Tr. 287-
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288). Even if such property were used after July 1,
1949, which is expressly denied, the maximum value that
could be placed upon such equipment would be less than
$5.00 and not $300 or thereabouts as the respondents·
would claim in their brief. The respondents also refer
to a check for the purchase of gaso~ine to one Galloway,
(Tr. 227). The witness didn't know how much gas he
had used or how much he had left over but it is contended
that if he ever paid $98.00 to one Galloway for gasoline
that it was for fuel delivered to the Ida Mining Camp
where he testified to have been working at the time of
this alleged pumping operation and there is no evidence
whatsoever that any amount of money was 'Spent for
gasoline on the Black Jack mining claim after JUly 1,
1949.

POINT III.
GOOD FAITH

The appellants specifically avoided reference to the
issue of lack of good faith referred to in the respondents'
brief for the reason that the evidence speaks. far more
emphatically than argument. The appellants waited
for approxirr1ately two years to see if there was any mining activity being conducted upon the property or any
improvements being made. For two years they saw
nothing but a forfeited area where no one came to make
improvements or inspect the property or even to replace
n1onuments or houn,dary markers; where there was no
effort made to file notice of assessment work. F'eeiing

1.9
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as they did that the property could be iu1proved under
the n1ining laws of the United States and the ~tate of
Utah, they staked their mining claims, and in11nedia tel~·
did over one thousand dollars worth of labor on the
property.
It woultd seem all evidence of lack of good faith would
be on the part of the respondents. 1._1he.re was definitely
no effort to improve the property as required by the
mining laws of the United States and the State of Utah.
I-Iarold Evans, the only person purporting to have done
any work on the property, stated in his deposition that
he surrendered his lease on April 19, 1949 and told Morgan he w.as through, and moved all his equipment. r~l_1hjs
dog in the manger attitude of not wanting to work the
property or not wanting anyone else to, is contrary to
the policy of mining claims in the United States.

CONCLUSION
The entire case of the respondents switched as they
have from one position to another has shown nothing but
a confused effort to make a claim to the property which
under all the cases and practices of mining law was forfeited and abandoned. For the court to permit a notice
fi'led by a stranger to become effective to perserve the
forfeited and abandoned rights of those who had completely failed to abide by the United States mining la\vs
and regulations would be to throw the entire field of
ruining law into chaos by allowing a former owner to
come in after two years of abandone·d and forfeited in20
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terests and activity. Under such doctrine the mining
areas of the United States could go undeveloped and monopolized by the shiftless and non-ac:tive prospector.
Respectfully submitted,

A. ELIASON'
Delta, Utah
Attorney for Ap·pellants.
ELDON
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